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T
he ﬁftieth anniversary of Federal Reserve Independence Day was
March 4, 2001. After World War II ended, the Fed continued its
wartime pegging of interest rates. The Treasury-Fed Accord, an-
nounced March 4, 1951, freed the Fed from that obligation. Below, we chron-
icle the dramatic confrontation between the Fed and the White House that
ended with theAccord.1
1. THE CHALLENGE TO THE TREASURY
In April 1942, after the entry of the United States into World War II, the
Fed publicly committed itself to maintaining an interest rate of 3/8 percent
on Treasury bills. In practice, it also established an upper limit to the term
structure of interest rates on government debt. The ceiling for long-term
government bonds was 2 1/2 percent. In summer 1947, the Fed raised the peg
on the Treasury bill rate.2 However, the Treasury adamantly insisted that the
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2 Given the ﬂoor placed under the price of long-term securities, they were as liquid as short-
term securities. Individuals and institutions then had no incentive to hold short-term securities. By
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Fed continue to place a ﬂoor under the price of government debt by placing a
ceiling on its yield.
After World War II, the predominant concern of public policy was to
prevent a return of the Great Depression and high unemployment.3 However,
the primary postwar problem turned out to be inﬂation rather than economic
depression. Over the 12-month periods ending June 1947 and June 1948,
respectively, CPI inﬂation was 17.6 and 9.5 percent.
This inﬂation arose from the end of wartime price controls and ceased
in summer 1948. The recession that began in November 1948 temporarily
rendered moot the issue of interest rate ceilings. However, the change in the
intellectual and political environment begun during the economic depression
of the thirties and reinforced by the economic boom of the forties assigned to
governmentanactiveroleineconomicstabilization. Inevitably,theFedwould
want to establish a role in controlling inﬂation and dealing with recession. By
the time inﬂation threatened a second time with the outbreak of the Korean
War, ﬁve years of relative economic stability had made the threat of a return
to the depression of the thirties seem less real. Nevertheless, the Fed was not
in a position to win a contest of wills with the Treasury and rid itself of the
obligation to maintain the price of government bonds.4
Ralph Leach joined the Fed right before the events that provoked open
confrontation between the Federal Reserve System and the Treasury. After
serving inWorldWar II in the South Paciﬁc, he managed the Treasury portfo-
lios of two moderately sized banks, ﬁrst in Chicago and later in Phoenix. In
both cases, he was an active trader of government securities. He developed a
telephoneacquaintancewithallthemajorTreasurydealersandjoinedthemin
the daily routine of guessing what the actions of the Fed’s NewYork Trading
Desk would be.
In spring 1950, the Federal Reserve Board decided to add someone with
market experience to its Washington staff. Some of Leach’s associates rec-
ommended him. After talking with Winﬁeld Rieﬂer and Woodlief Thomas,
Leach accepted the position of Chief of the Government Securities Section of
the Research Division.5
1947, basically only the Fed held short-term securities. Raising the rate the Treasury paid on them
had no consequences for the Treasury as the Fed recycled the interest payments to the Treasury.
3 Goodwin and Herren (1975) offer an excellent overview of the political and intellectual
environment that shaped monetary policy in the post–World War II period.
4 Friedman and Schwartz (1963, Chapter 9, “Cyclical Changes, 1933–41”) relate how the Fed
had not conducted an active monetary policy since 1933.
5 To make a case for an independent monetary policy directed toward economic stabilization,
policymakers had to rely on the persuasiveness of their ideas. For this reason, Fed economists
played an indispensable role in achieving the Accord. The most important was Winﬁeld B. Rieﬂer.
Thomas McCabe accepted the position of Chairman of the Board of Governors in 1948 on the
condition that Winﬁeld B. Rieﬂer accompany him to Washington as personal adviser. Leach recalls
Rieﬂer as an extraordinary individual with an exceptional background. He dominated discussion
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The KoreanWar broke out the day before Leach started his new job. Both
Rieﬂer and Thomas came to his ofﬁce to say they felt they had done him a
disservice. They feared that war would lead to the continued pegging of the
governmentsecuritiesmarketratherthanthedevelopmentofafreemarketthat
would permit an independent monetary policy. In fact, the opposite occurred.
Particularly since its meeting on June 13, 1950, the FOMC had chafed
at the straitjacket imposed by the rigid regime of rate pegging.6 After the
trough of the business cycle in October 1949, the economy had recovered
strongly. Fearful of an economic boom that would revive inﬂation, at the
June meeting NewYork Fed PresidentAllan Sproul had recommended raising
short-term rates by 1/8 percent.7 Although long-term bonds were selling
In the twenties, Rieﬂer had worked at the Board of Governors in Washington. While there,
he developed the table in the Federal Reserve Bulletin currently called “Reserves of Depository
Institutions and Reserve Bank Credit,” which provides a consolidated Treasury-Fed account of the
factors that supply and absorb bank reserves and currency. In a Ph.D. thesis originally written at
the Brookings Institution and later published as a book, Rieﬂer (1930) showed how Fed actions
that affect bank reserves inﬂuence short-term interest rates.
In the early thirties, Rieﬂer left the Fed for the Roosevelt Administration, where he helped
write the Federal Housing Act. He conceived and developed the idea of the self-amortizing home
mortgage, before which home mortgages had matured in ﬁve years and required full payment of
the principal at the end. After leaving government, Rieﬂer joined the Institute for Advanced Studies
at Princeton.
Rieﬂer wanted to reestablish Fed independence and to reorient monetary policy to the goal
of economic stabilization. He realized that his goal would require a free market in government
securities. Not only would the Fed have to abandon its bond support program, but it also would
have to allow and encourage the market to set government bond prices. It is hard to imagine
now, but at the time there was no free market in government securities.
6 The FOMC comprised all the Board governors and the ﬁve regional Bank governors who
were voting members. Because New York always voted, only four of the other regional Bank
presidents attended FOMC meetings. The difﬁculty of transportation limited the ability of all
regional Bank presidents to attend. The FOMC issued the directive as a guide to monetary policy.
However, the directive changed only infrequently. Its language reﬂected the phase of the business
cycle and accordingly stated whether the primary goal of monetary policy was to restrain inﬂation
or to encourage economic activity.
At that time, the full FOMC left the implementation of the directive to the Executive Com-
mittee. Because the Executive Committee issued operational instruction to the Desk, it actually
made monetary policy. The Executive Committee comprised the Board Chairman, two governors,
the president of the New York Fed, and one regional Bank president. The FOMC met about ﬁve
times a year and the Executive Committee met separately six or seven times a year. Two members,
Allan Sproul (President of the New York Fed) and Marriner Eccles (Board governor), dominated
the Executive Committee.
7Allan Sproul was one of the giants of central banking. Sproul joined the San Francisco Fed
in 1920. As Secretary of the Bank, he traveled to Washington for meetings on monetary policy.
His abilities attracted the attention of Benjamin Strong, the legendary ﬁrst governor of the New
York Fed, and George Harrison, who succeeded Strong. Harrison brought Sproul to New York in
early 1930. Sproul became Harrison’s assistant and later managed open market operations for the
New York Desk. He became President of the New York Fed in 1941 (see Sproul [1980], Chapter
1).
In the twenties, the New York Fed had functioned as the central bank of the United States
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963, Chapter 6). Allan Sproul wanted to reestablish the earlier dominant
position of the New York Fed. In 1946, he turned down an offer to head the newly formed World
Bank because of the importance he assigned to reviving monetary policy (Sproul 1980, p. 11).
Sproul was the preeminent central banker within the Fed. He could articulate ideas and was the
ﬁrst FOMC member to bring to the FOMC table the idea that became a rallying point for the36 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
above par (yielding less than the 2 1/2 percent ceiling), everyone knew that
the Fed’s Rubicon would be a rise in short-term rates incompatible with this
2 1/2 percent wartime ceiling. Sproul commented, “[I]f we are faced with the
decision whether to let long-term bonds go below par, I would let them go
below par” (FOMC Minutes, 6/13/50, p. 87).
At the August meeting, the FOMC decided to challenge Treasury Secre-
tarySnyder’sunwillingnesstoallowanyriseinrates, short-termorlong-term.
Later, President Sproul expressed the frustration the Committee had experi-
enced in dealing with the Secretary:
[W]e had been discussing these problems with him for more than a
year....[H]e had discussed them with us little or not all....[H]e had
usually turned to an associate and usually asked if they had any comment
to make and then said that he would let us know what he was going
to do....[T]hat had usually been followed by an announcement by him,
often anticipating far in advance his needs, of the ﬁnancing program
which had differed almost completely from our recommendations and
which had had the effect of freezing our position [by announcing security
offerings at the pegged rates]. (FOMC Minutes, 2/6/51, p. 69)
In the summer of 1950, the FOMC had asked the Treasury to replace
the 2 1/2 percent marketable bonds with nonmarketable bonds. If market
forces pushed up long-term interest rates, the Fed would not have to buy
the nonmarketable bonds. However, the Treasury refused the Fed request
(FOMCMinutes, 8/18/50, p.131). Theseone-wayconversationsreﬂectedthe
Treasury’s dominant position.
A telling example occurred on the day of theAugust FOMC meeting. At
the Treasury’s invitation, members of the FOMC went to the Treasury after
lunch to see a chart show on the distribution of Treasury securities by class
of investor. However, before they went, Treasury Representative Mr. Haas
called. He announced “that, while he would be glad to show the slides to
members of the Committee and the staff, he and the staff could not spare the
time for a discussion of the ﬁgures” (FOMC Minutes, 8/18/50, p. 133).
AttheAugustFOMCmeeting, Sproulraisedthechallenge. Hereferredto
the Fed’s fruitless discussions with the Treasury and said, “We have marched
up the hill several times and then marched down again. This time I think we
should act on the basis of our unwillingness to continue to supply reserves
to the market by supporting the existing rate structure and should advise the
Treasury that this is what we intend to do—not seek instructions” (FOMC
Minutes, 8/18/50, p. 137).
Fed in its effort to end the interest rate peg. Namely, the Fed should control bank reserves and
let the market determine the interest rate.R. L. Hetzel and R. F. Leach: New NarrativeAccount 37
GovernorEcclesagreedwithSproulthatiftheSystem“expectedtosurvive
as an agency with any independence whatsoever [it] should exercise some
independence” (FOMC Minutes, 8/18/50, p. 137).8 Despite concern about
theTreasury refunding of the September 1 1/4 percent certiﬁcates maturing in
two weeks, the FOMC agreed to raise the interest rate on one-year Treasury
securitiesfrom11/4to13/8percent. ThemembersoftheBoardofGovernors
also decided to approve the recommendation of the NewYork Fed to increase
the discount rate from 1 1/2 to 1 3/4 percent. Chairman McCabe and Vice
Chairman Sproul then prepared to go to the Treasury to inform Secretary
Snyder of the FOMC’s decision.9
However, the question arose of what the FOMC should do if the Treasury
preempted its action by announcing an immediate refunding of the one-year
securities at the existing 1 1/4 percent rate (FOMC Minutes, 8/18/50, p. 147).
Leach recalls asking Chairman McCabe if he could make a comment on the
market. McCabereplied,“Wedon’thaveopinionsonthemarketdownhere—
we rely on NewYork for those opinions.” After an awkward silence, Sproul
turned to Leach and said, “I would like to hear your comment.” Leach’s
suggestion was that the Board announce the discount rate change after the
market closed that day (Friday), but with no comment.
Leach recalls arguing that the NewYork Desk should put out a par bid for
all of the new Treasury issue when the market opened Monday morning. The
result would be that the NewYork Desk would purchase the Treasury issue at
the (“high”) price consistent with the current rate peg. However, as the Desk
bought the new issue, it would sell other short-term issues at (“low”) prices
consistent with the desired rise in interest rates. That action would prevent
8 President Roosevelt had appointed Marriner Eccles Chairman (then called “governor”) of the
Board of Governors effective November 15, 1934. First Roosevelt and then Truman reappointed
him to successive four-year terms in that position. However, when his term expired January 29,
1948, in a move that surprised Eccles, Truman declined to reappoint him (see “Knifed” in Hyman
[1976]).
Truman did not explain his decision. Although Eccles never learned the reason, he considered
two possibilities (Hyman 1976, p. 339). Treasury Secretary Snyder may have wanted to get rid of
him as an “abrasive adversary.” Alternatively, in a presidential election year, Eccles was a political
liability to Truman in California. Eccles was a ﬁerce opponent of the attempt by California banker
A. P. Giannini to use the holding company Transamerica to expand the branch bank network of
the Bank of America in California. Eccles’s term as Board governor did not expire until 1958.
Although no longer Board Chairman, he remained on the Board of Governors. (He retired in July
1951.)
Eccles had believed that the government should use ﬁscal policy (what he called compensatory
ﬁnance) to stabilize the economy (see Eccles [1951]). Only gradually did he come to believe that
the Fed should control reserve creation by allowing the market determination of interest rates.
Once converted to that view, he provoked the ultimate confrontation with the White House.
9 Thomas B. McCabe, Chairman of Scott Paper Company, replaced Eccles as Chairman of
the Board of Governors. McCabe had been chairman of the Philadelphia Fed’s Board of Directors.
Leach recalls that McCabe made the Accord possible through the professional, honest way that he
presented the case for monetary independence to the executive branch and Congress.38 FederalReserveBankofRichmondEconomicQuarterly
failure of the refunding because the Fed would buy the Treasury issues. At
the same time, it would raise short-term interest rates.
Sproul asked for a short recess during which he, Robert Rouse (head
of the New York Trading Desk), and Leach discussed the probable market
response. Sproul then endorsed the plan and the FOMC approved it. The
Board of Governors approved the discount rate increase, which it announced
without comment after the market closed. McCabe and Sproul then made the
ﬁve-minute drive to the Treasury to see Secretary Snyder.
Leach recalls hearing that when told that the Fed planned to raise short-
term interest rates, Secretary Snyder reacted angrily. He immediately an-
nounced the refunding of the 13-month Treasury issues maturing not only in
September but also in October. He rolled them both into 13-month notes at
the pegged rate of 1 1/4 percent. Snyder assumed, incorrectly as it turned
out, that his action would force the Fed into maintaining the old pegged rate.
Dealers immediately understood the implications of the Desk’s par bid for the
new Treasury issue. At the opening of the market on Monday, they dropped
their offering prices (raising rates) on other short-term issues. In the next few
days, several billion dollars in securities traded at the higher rates (and at the
corresponding lower prices).
At the beginning of the August 1950 FOMC meeting, Governor Eccles
had argued that the Fed could act only with Treasury acquiescence. During
the lunch break, other staff members and Leach explained to him that buying
the new issue at par would soften the challenge to the Treasury. When the
meeting resumed, Eccles argued that the proposed action would be a good
way to get the debate into the open. As Thomas told Leach after the meeting,
“We walked him [Eccles] up one side of Constitution Avenue and down the
other, and it turned out well.” But Thomas also said that Eccles wanted to see
Leach in his private ofﬁce. There, Eccles gave Leach quite a dressing down
for having been too forward at the meeting.
Newspapers were full of stories of the Fed challenge to the Treasury. Fed
critics claimed that the Fed had taken over management of the federal debt.
FedsupporterscounteredthattheTreasuryshouldpriceitsofferingsatinterest
rates that would attract investors to buy and hold them.
At the September 27, 1950, meeting of the Executive Committee, Allan
Sproul, associate economist John Williams, and Board economist Winﬁeld
Rieﬂerarguedforanotherriseinshort-termrates.10 MarrinerEcclesdemurred.
10 Sproul valued highly his conversations with John H. Williams. Williams was both an ofﬁcer
of the New York Bank and a professor at Harvard. (He trained many of the next generation of
Fed policymakers.) He was a renowned expert in international ﬁnance and became President of
the American Economic Association in 1952. Williams (FOMC Minutes, 8/18/50, p. 144) said at
the August 1950 FOMC meeting that “[T]he basic question was how far the committee would be
willing to see interest rates rise in order to curb monetary inﬂation and everything else would be
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He argued that no signiﬁcant increase in short-term rates would be possible
without an increase in the long-term rate. Before that could happen, Eccles
said, the Fed would need to “present the matter to Congress with a clear
explanation of the problems and the alternatives available” (FOMC Minutes,
9/27/50, p. 167). At the time, the success of General Douglas MacArthur’s
September 15 Inchon landing, 200 miles behind enemy lines, must have made
the viability of the 2 1/2 bond rate peg appear less problematic. If the troops
werehomebyChristmas,theTreasurywouldnothavetoissuenewdebt.
At its meeting on October 11, the FOMC gave the Executive Committee
authority to raise the one-year Treasury bill rate. The Executive Committee
raised the rate to 1 1/2 percent despite “the strong feeling of the Secretary of
the Treasury that the action should not be taken (FOMC Minutes, 10/11/50,
p. 197). On October 16, the Board of Governors sent a letter to Secretary
Snyder explaining its actions. It stated, “We can assure you that these actions
will not affect the maintenance of the 2 1/2 percent rate for the outstanding
long-term government bonds” (FOMC Minutes, 10/11/50, p. 209).
Within the FOMC, President Truman had an ally who used newspaper
leaks to discredit Chairman McCabe. Newspapers like the American Banker
presented accounts of conﬁdential System meetings that derived from an in-
sider. Those leaked versions incorrectly portrayed FOMC participants as
divided in their challenge to the Treasury. Suspicion focused on Governor
James K. (Jake)Vardaman, who had been a close friend of President Truman
from the latter’s early days as a politician in Kansas City, Missouri. Truman
had appointed him to the Board in 1946.
Leach recalls that at a Board meeting in fall 1950, Board Vice Chairman
M. S. (Matt) Szymczak declared that the leaks were disgraceful and that he
was not responsible for them. One by one, the governors repeated Governor
Szymczak’s statement. Vardaman could see the sentiment moving around the
table toward him. Before it reached him, he rose from the table and left the
room stating, “I don’t have to put up with this.”
Throughoutthefall,FOMCChairmanMcCabeandViceChairmanSproul
attempted to persuade Treasury Secretary Snyder directly and, indirectly
through him, President Truman of the need to raise interest rates. However,
the chasm that existed was unbridgeable. Truman and Snyder were populists
Williams, like other Fed economists, tempered the Keynesian views of academia in response
to postwar policy problems. Contrary to the expectations of Keynesians, the most important policy
problem after the war was inﬂation rather than depression. The problem was not how to stimu-
late aggregate demand, but rather how to restrain it. In his presidential address to the American
Economics Association, Williams (1952, p. 8) criticized Keynes. “Keynes’ emphasis on the demand
side—his principle of effective demand—sins quite as much in its taking for granted the adapt-
ability of supply as the classical economists did in their reverse emphasis. This has interested
me particularly in connection with problems of international trade adjustment.” (The last comment
refers to Williams’s consulting on the overvalued British pound.) Fed economists thus recognized
the importance of monetary policy and its relation to inﬂation some 20 years before the economics
profession began to debate seriously that possibility.40 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
who believed that banks, not the market forces of supply and demand, set
interest rates. Truman felt that government had a moral obligation to protect
the market value of the war bonds purchased by patriotic citizens. He talked
about how in World War I he had purchased Liberty Bonds, only to see their
value fall after the war.11
Although the Fed continued to try to convince the Treasury of the need
for a rise in interest rates, it never considered unilateral abandonment of the
21/2percentbondratepeg. However, andthiswasthestickingpoint, itwould
not publicly commit to the indeﬁnite maintenance of the peg. The Treasury
wanted the Fed to commit publicly to maintaining the existing interest rate
structure for the duration of hostilities in Korea. In early December, President
Truman telephoned Chairman McCabe at McCabe’s home and urged him to
“stick rigidly to the pegged rates on the longest bonds.” McCabe replied that
he“couldnotunderstandwhywewould...allowthelifeinsurancecompanies
to unload [their bonds] on us” (FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, p. 9).
Truman followed up by writing McCabe:
[T]he Federal Reserve Board should make it perfectly plain...totheNew
York Bankers that the peg is stabilized....I hope the Board will...not
allow the bottom to drop from under our securities. If that happens that
is exactly what Mr. Stalin wants. (FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, p. 9)
2. FROM STALEMATE TO CONFRONTATION
The formally correct but strained relationship between the Fed and the Treas-
ury fell apart as the war in Korea intensiﬁed. On November 25 and 26, the
Chinese army, 300 thousand strong, crossed the Yalu River. Suddenly, the
United States faced the possibility of a war with China and, if the Soviet
Union came to the aid of its ally, ofWorldWar III.As the communists pushed
AlliedforcesbackdowntheKoreanpeninsula,Washingtonwonderedwhether
General MacArthur could stop the communist advance at the 38th parallel.
MacArthurrequestedauthoritytoinvolvetheNationalisttroopsofChiangKai-
shek, and Truman at a press conference left the impression that MacArthur
could use atomic weapons. Anticipating the reimposition of wartime con-
trols and shortages, consumers rushed out to buy consumer durables. On
world markets, commodity prices soared. For the three-month period ending
February 1951, CPI inﬂation was at an annualized rate of 21 percent.
11 Truman wrote Russell C. Lefﬁngwell, Chairman of J. P. Morgan, “I can’t understand why
the bankers would want to upset the credit of the nation in the midst of a terrible national emer-
gency. That seems to be what they want to do and if I can prevent it they are not going to do it”
(Donovan 1982, p. 329). Snyder believed that “Sproul and New York bankers and brokers were
trying to recapture the primacy in ﬁscal and monetary affairs that had been lost to Washington
during the New Deal” (Donovan 1982, p. 328).R. L. Hetzel and R. F. Leach: New NarrativeAccount 41
The working relationship between the Fed and theTreasury then began to
unravel. Theprospectofaprolongedwarcreatedthelikelihoodofgovernment
deﬁcitsandtheissuanceofnewgovernmentdebt. Additionaldebtwouldforce
down the price of debt unless the Fed monetized it. That is, to prevent yields
from rising above the 2 1/2 percent rate peg, the Fed would have to buy debt
and increase bank reserves. Banks would then fuel an inﬂationary expansion
through increases in credit and the money supply.
At the November 27 FOMC meeting, Sproul argued that “[W]e must look
toward unfreezing the long end of the rate pattern as well as the short end.”
Eccles countered that the Fed should “present the matter to Congress and that
the Congress should decide” (FOMC Minutes, 11/27/50, p. 236). However,
he made an additional suggestion. Throughout 1950, the 2 1/2 percent ceiling
on bond rates had not been binding. The NewYork Desk had kept the price
of long-term bonds above par (their interest rate below to 2 1/2 percent), and
the Desk still had to sell bonds. Eccles advocated that their price be allowed
to fall somewhat so that they would trade just below 2 1/2 percent.
That fall in the bond price would still leave in place the sacrosanct 2 1/2
percent rate peg. However, it would address an immediate problem. The
threat of a major, protracted war created the real possibility that the bond rate
would rise to its 2 1/2 percent ceiling. Life insurance companies, which held
the bonds, then had an incentive to sell them immediately to avoid a capital
lossasbondpricesdeclined.12 TheFeddidnotwanttomonetizeanavalanche
of bond sales. For that reason, it wanted to eliminate the above-par price on
the bonds. TheTreasury, in contrast, saw the problem as one of the Fed’s own
creation. If the Fed would only publicly commit to maintaining indeﬁnitely
the current price of bonds, it believed, bond holders would no longer have an
incentive to sell.
These conﬂicting views collided over a routine Treasury refunding. On
November 13, Secretary Snyder wrote Chairman McCabe requesting the
FOMC’sviewsontheappropriateyieldstoofferonaDecember15refunding.
The Treasury accepted the Fed’s advice and priced its issues in a way that re-
ﬂected the Fed’s recent increase in short-term rates. However, the refunding
went poorly. Snyder believed that the Fed had reneged on a pledge of full
cooperation. Why?
During the time that elapsed between the pricing of the new issues and
bringing them to market, the Chinese entered the war and routed American
forces. Forthereasongivenabove,theFOMCthenreducedslightlyitsbuying
price for long-term bonds. Secretary Snyder saw that action as creating a fear
of capital loss that hindered the success of the refunding. On December
9, McCabe had written President Truman that the Fed would give its full
12 Life insurance companies held the bonds; banks were prohibited from holding them.42 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
support to the refunding; Snyder believed that the Fed had not honored that
commitment.13
McCabe and Sproul met with Snyder on January 3, 1951. Sproul argued
that the inﬂation following World War II had come from too low a rate peg.
He accepted that the possibility of large future government deﬁcits might
necessitatemaintainingaratepeg. However,inanticipationofthateventuality,
the Fed should allow a higher level of the peg. He also added, “If present
inﬂationary advances in the credit sector continue...further action to restrict
theavailabilityofbankreserveswouldbeinorder”(FOMCMinutes, 1/31/51,
p. 5).
On January 17, 1951, McCabe met with Truman and Snyder at the White
House. Whenhereturnedfromthemeeting, McCabedictatedamemorandum
oftheconversation(seeFOMCMinutes, 1/31/51, pp.12–13). Atthemeeting,
he made the point that “the purchase of these bonds resulted in the creation
of reserves in the banks, which were very inﬂationary.” Truman and Snyder
reiterated their desire for the Fed to make a public commitment to the 2 1/2
percent bond peg. Snyder argued that investors would stop selling their bonds
if the Fed were to reassure them that it would maintain the price of bonds.
OnJanuary18, SecretarySnyderaddressedtheNewYorkBoardofTrade.
There he announced that Chairman McCabe had agreed that future Treasury
“issues will be ﬁnanced within the pattern of that [2 1/2 percent] rate” (U.S.
Treasury 1951, p. 616). In his memoirs, Eccles (1951, p. 485) expressed his
feelings by quoting commentary contained in the New York Times: “[L]ast
Thursday constituted the ﬁrst occasion in history on which the head of the
Exchequerofagreatnationhadeithertheeffronteryortheineptitude, orboth,
to deliver a public address in which he has so far usurped the function of the
central bank as to tell the country what kind of monetary policy it was going
to be subjected to.” When the FOMC met on January 31, McCabe told its
members that he was “shocked to read the account of Snyder’s speech” and
that he had made no such commitment (FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, p. 14).
Later, in a written response to questions from Representative Wright Pat-
man (February 12, 1952), Secretary Snyder said that Chairman McCabe had
“assured the president that he need not be concerned about the 2-1/2 percent
long-termrate”(U.S.Treasury1951,p.270). DuringthePatmanhearingsover
the Fed-Treasury relationship in March 1952, Senator Douglas failed to get
a clariﬁcation from Secretary Snyder on exactly what McCabe had promised
anddeclared,“Talleyrandsaidthatwordswereusedtoconcealthought. Ihave
always thought that words should be used to express thought, and it is the lack
13 The Treasury’s version of the dispute appears in the reply to the Patman questionnaire by
Treasury Secretary Snyder in U.S. Congress (1952a). The reply is also reprinted in U.S. Treasury
(1951). The Fed’s version is contained in Allan Sproul’s (1952, p. 521) testimony in the Patman
Hearings in U.S. Congress (1952b). Walker (1955) contains a readable summary.R. L. Hetzel and R. F. Leach: New Narrative Account 43
of this quality which I ﬁnd unsatisfactory in your testimony throughout” (U.S.
Congress 1952b, p. 37).
Truman had compelling reasons to freeze interest rates. On January 25,
1951, he froze wages and prices, apart from farm prices. Raising the cost of
borrowing,especiallyonhomemortgages,whilefreezingwageswaspoison.14
More important, in January 1951 Truman confronted the possibility of world
war. TreasurycommunicationwiththeFedreferredtoapossibleSovietattack
on the United States “within the foreseeable future” (FOMC Minutes, 3/1/51,
p. 119). Truman and Snyder wanted to keep down the cost of ﬁnancing the
deﬁcits that would emerge from a wider war.
Truman and the leadership in Congress believed that deﬁcit ﬁnancing
had caused the World War II inﬂation (Goodwin and Herren 1975, p. 70;
Donovan 1982, p. 325). At the urging of theAdministration, Congress raised
taxes sharply in September 1950 with the Revenue Act of 1950 and again in
January 1951 with an excess proﬁts tax (Goodwin and Herren 1976, p. 71).
However, if the war widened to include China and possibly the Soviet Union,
there would be government deﬁcits.
Byearly1951,communistforceshadrecapturedPyongyangandSeoul. In
a cable toWashington, General MacArthur stated that the “military position is
untenable, but it can hold for any length of time up to its complete destruction
ifoverridingpoliticalconsiderationssodictate.”15 SecretaryofStateAcheson
decidedthattheEighthArmyshouldwithdrawfromKoreaiflossesthreatened
its ability to defend Japan. A naval blockade of China that would provoke a
wider war loomed as a possibility. Later, General Omar Bradley said, “[I]f
we had been driven out, I think our people would have demanded something
else be done against China.”
OnJanuary25, GovernorEccles, speakingforhimself, openlychallenged
theAdministration in testimony before the Joint Committee on the Economic
Report. He testiﬁed:
As long as the Federal Reserve is required to buy government securities
at the will of the market for the purpose of defending a ﬁxed pattern of
interest rates established by the Treasury, it must stand ready to create
new bank reserves in unlimited amount. This policy makes the entire
banking system, through the action of the Federal Reserve System, an
engine of inﬂation. (U.S. Congress 1951, p. 158)
Governor Eccles and Representative Wright Patman, who was a populist
congressman from Texarkana, Texas, went head-to-head:
14 See, for example, the exchange between Governor Eccles and Senator Joseph C.
O’Mahoney in U.S. Congress 1951, p. 181.
15 The material in this paragraph is from Donovan (1982, p. 346–48).44 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Patman: Don’t you think there is some obligation of the Federal Reserve
System to protect the public against excessive interest rates?
Eccles: I think there is a greater obligation to the American public to
protect them against the deterioration of the dollar.
Patman: Who is master, the Federal Reserve or the Treasury? You know,
the Treasury came here ﬁrst.
Eccles: How do you reconcile the Treasury’s position of saying they
want the interest rate low, with the Federal Reserve standing ready to
peg the market, and at the same time expect to stop inﬂation?
Patman: Will the Federal Reserve System support the Secretary of
the Treasury in that effort [to retain the 2 1/2 percent rate] or will
it refuse?...You are sabotaging the Treasury. I think it ought to be
stopped.
Eccles: [E]ither the Federal Reserve should be recognized as having some
independent status, or it should be considered as simply an agency or a
bureau of the Treasury. (U.S. Congress 1951, pp. 172–76)
On January 29, in an open challenge to the Treasury, the Fed lowered the
bond price (raised its yield) by 1/32. Although the bond yield remained just
below 2 1/2 percent, that action prompted Snyder to ask Truman to call the
entire FOMC to the White House (FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, p. 20). It was
the ﬁrst time in history that any President had called the FOMC to meet with
him.16 The FOMC met on January 31 and McCabe informed its members
that they could either resign or agree to the President’s demand to peg interest
rates. Sproul suggested an additional alternative, namely to ask Congress to
resolve the impasse (FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, pp. 15–16, 19).
The FOMC then tried to prepare a statement for its meeting with the
President. Governor Vardaman disagreed with the contents and stated that
“in a period such as the present, the members of the Board ceased to be
civilian ofﬁcers of the government, and that he would be guided by whatever
requestwasmadebythePresidentasCommander-in-Chief”(FOMCMinutes,
1/31/51, p. 21). Sproul replied that this “would make the Federal Reserve
System a bureau of the Treasury and, in light of the responsibilities placed
in the System by the Congress, would be both impossible and improper”
(FOMC Minutes, 1/31/51, p. 23). The FOMC abandoned the attempt to draft
a statement.
The FOMC met with President Truman late in the afternoon of Wednes-
day, January 31.17 Truman began by stating that “the present emergency is
16Allan Sproul (1980) and Marriner Eccles (1951) have provided eyewitness accounts. (Stein
[1990] and Walker [1955] provide a historical overview.)
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the greatest this country has ever faced, including the two World Wars and
all the preceding wars....[W]e must combat Communist inﬂuence on many
fronts....[I]f the people lose conﬁdence in government securities all we hope
to gain from our military mobilization, and war if need be, might be jeopar-
dized.” Chairman McCabe in turn explained the responsibility of the Federal
Reserve “to promote stability in the economy by regulating the volume, cost
and availability of money, keeping in mind at all times the best interests of the
whole economy.” McCabe suggested a continuing dialogue with Secretary
Snyder, and, if that dialogue failed, a meeting between him and the President.
After meeting with the President, the FOMC reconvened and asked Gov-
ernor Evans to prepare a memorandum recording the events of the meeting.18
Sproul reviewed it. The memorandum recorded that FOMC members had
made no commitment to the President. Nonetheless, the next morning the
White House press secretary issued a statement that “The Federal Reserve
Board has pledged its support to President Truman to maintain the stability
of Government securities as long as the emergency lasts.” The Treasury then
issued a statement saying that the White House announcement “means the
market for Government securities will be stabilized at present levels and that
these levels will be maintained during the present emergency.”19
Eccles received telephone calls from Alfred Friendly of the Washington
Post and Felix Belair, Jr., of the New York Times. Eccles contradicted the
Administration’s press releases by telling them that the FOMC had made no
such commitment. Without attribution, the two newspapers reported Eccles’s
comments the next day. The following morning, Friday, members of the
Executive Committee met informally at the request of GovernorVardaman.20
Vardaman demanded to know who was the source of the Times story. Eccles
said that he was the source and defended his release of the information.
The governors then had to decide how to respond to a letter that Chairman
McCabe had just received from President Truman. The “Dear Tom” letter
included the false statement, “I have your assurance that the market on gov-
ernment securities will be stabilized and maintained at present levels.” After
discussion, the FOMC agreed that McCabe should meet privately with Presi-
dent Truman to ask him to withdraw the letter. However, McCabe went to his
house in Philadelphia for the weekend without seeing Truman.
Upon seeing the stories in the Washington Post and the New York Times,
and without informing McCabe, Snyder had Truman release to the press his
(Truman’s) letter to McCabe. Later, in his memoirs, Eccles (1951, p. 494)
recorded his reaction. “[T]he letter was the ﬁnal move in a Treasury attempt
to impose its will on the Federal Reserve. If swift action was not taken...the
18 The above quotes are from this memorandum.
19 This paragraph and the next three are from Eccles (1951, pp. 491–93).
20 This account is from Eccles (1951, pp. 491–97) and Hyman (1976, pp. 349–51).46 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Federal Reserve would...lose the independent status Congress meant it to
haveand...would be reduced to the level of a Treasury bureau.”
Eccles also reported in his memoirs that shortly before this event he had
completedaletterofresignationtothePresident. Hethendecidedtopostpone
his resignation. Eccles had been Chairman of the FOMC from its creation in
1935 until 1948. He did not intend to leave Washington with the Federal Re-
serve under the control of the Treasury. According to a Truman staff member,
Truman had failed to reappoint Eccles as Board Chairman in 1948 to show
him “who’s boss” (Donovan 1982, p. 331). Eccles’s feeling that Truman had
treated him peremptorily must have still rankled.
Belair of the New York Times telephoned Eccles (1951, p. 494) and in-
formed him of the release of Truman’s letter. Eccles then made a momentous
decision. Acting on his own, he released a copy of the memorandum written
to record the FOMC’s account of the meeting with President Truman. Eccles
arrangedforittoappearintheSunday,February4,editionnotonlyoftheNew
York Times, but also of theWashington Post and theWashington Evening Star.
The memorandum was headline news. As Eccles (1951, p. 496) put it, “[T]he
fat was in the ﬁre.” Hyman (1976, p. 349) wrote, “By Monday morning the
controversy had reached blast furnace heat.”
Tuesday, February 6, Chairman McCabe convened meetings ﬁrst of the
Board and then of the FOMC to decide what to do.21 GovernorVardaman had
written a statement asserting that “McCabe had given PresidentTruman every
reasontobelievethattheCommitteeandBoardwouldsupportthegovernment
ﬁnancing program.” Thwarted by Governor Powell in his attempt to send that
statement out as a press release,Vardaman demanded a meeting of the Board
unless he “wished to assume responsibility for throttling another member of
the Board” (Board Minutes, 2/6/51, p. 254). At the Board meeting, McCabe
accusedVardaman of leaking an account of the FOMC executive session after
the White House meeting to a newspaper reporter, Doris Fleeson. Vardaman
denied that he was the source of the leak, and Governor Evans asked “to have
the minutes show that he did not believe Mr. Vardaman’s statement” (Board
Minutes, 2/6/51, p. 257). Governor Szymczak said that President Truman
must have signed the letter to McCabe without having seen it, and Governor
Vardaman said that he “did not intend to discuss the veracity of the President”
(Board Minutes, 2/6/51, p. 259).
When the FOMC met, it discussed writing a letter to the President that
wouldreestablishaworkingrelationshipwiththeexecutivebranch. However,
aspointedoutbyGovernorVardaman,“[T]hesuggestionsmadebyMr.Sproul
did not contemplate any change in the policy of the committee, that was the
cruxofthematter”(FOMCMinutes,2/6/51,p.45). LedbySproulandEccles,
21 This paragraph draws on Board Minutes (1951, pp. 254–59).R. L. Hetzel and R. F. Leach: New NarrativeAccount 47
the FOMC was unwilling to make a long-term commitment to peg the price
of government bonds at 2 1/2 percent.
Forced by the rate peg issue to make a stand on the role of a central
bank in creating inﬂation, Eccles expressed the nature of a central bank in a
ﬁat money regime. It was not private speculation or government deﬁcits that
caused inﬂation, but rather reserves and money creation by the central bank.
Eccles said:
[We are making] it possible for the public to convert Government secu-
rities into money to expand the money supply....We are almost solely
responsible for this inﬂation. It is not deﬁcit ﬁnancing that is responsible
because there has been surplus in the Treasury right along; the whole
question of having rationing and price controls is due to the fact that we
have this monetary inﬂation, and this committee is the only agency in
existence that can curb and stop the growth of money....[W]e should tell
the Treasury, the President, and the Congress these facts, and do some-
thing about it....We have not only the power but the responsibility....If
Congress does not like what we are doing, then they can change the
rules. (FOMC Minutes, 2/6/51, pp. 50–51)
And in fact at the next FOMC meeting, Sproul would state the idea that a
central bank controls inﬂation through the monetary control made possible by
allowing market determination of the interest rate:
[T]he Committee did not in its operations drive securities to any price or
yield....[M]arket forces had been the determining factor, and that only
in resisting the creation of reserves had the committee been a party to
an increase in interest rates. That...was the result of market forces, and
not the action of the Committee. (FOMC Minutes, 3/1/51, pp. 125–26)
In a letter that accepted the responsibility of the Fed for inﬂation, the
FOMC wrote to Truman:
We favor the lowest rate of interest on government securities that will cause
true investors to buy and hold these securities. Today’s inﬂation...isdue
to mounting civilian expenditures largely ﬁnanced directly or indirectly
by sale of Government securities to the Federal Reserve....The inevitable
result is more and more money and cheaper and cheaper dollars. (FOMC
Minutes, 2/7/51, p. 60)
The white-hot crucible of debate over the consequences of interest rate
pegging marked an intellectual watershed. Gone was the self-image of a
central bank that allows an “elastic currency” passively to “accommodate
commerce” (see Humphrey [2001]). The Fed moved toward the idea of the
control of money creation to stabilize the purchasing power of the dollar.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The FOMC’s February 7 letter to President Truman contained its offer to
work with the Secretary of the Treasury. The FOMC also wrote a letter to the
Secretary making a number of speciﬁc proposals. McCabe ended the Febru-
ary 7 meeting by referring to a Wall Street Journal article purporting that the
discussion in the previous FOMC meeting had been “acrimonious”; also, sev-
eral senators had informed McCabe that a Board member was “undermining
with members of Congress” the FOMC’s position (FOMC Minutes, 2/7/51,
p. 66). (The leaks undermined the position of the Chairman by claiming that
his views did not reﬂect the views of the Committee.) McCabe threatened
dismissal for any FOMC member leaking conﬁdential discussion to the press
or Congress.
On February 8, McCabe and Sproul then met with Secretary Snyder. It
was their ﬁrst meeting since the February 4 newspaper stories contradicting
the White House statement that the Fed had committed itself to maintaining
the peg. McCabe recounted it that afternoon for the FOMC (FOMC Minutes,
2/8/51, pp. 67–68). Snyder “had very strong feelings about the situation that
had been created.” He claimed that McCabe had not followed through on
his [Snyder’s] “understandings” of the January 17 meeting with the President.
When McCabe read the letter the FOMC had written to the President, Snyder
called it “preachy.”
McCabe continued:
I also said that if the Secretary had in mind making a public announcement
like the one he made on January 18, I felt strongly that he should have
let me know, especially where he used my name and the President’s
name....I said to the Secretary, “The President told me afterward that
he did not know you were going to make a speech in New York.” That
disturbed Secretary Snyder very greatly. He said the President knew
exactly what he was going to say....I said this had cut me very deeply.
(FOMC Minutes, 2/8/51, p. 68)
During its afternoon meeting, the FOMC learned that the President had
said at a news conference that “it was his understanding that a majority of the
Reserve Board members sided with him on the interest rate question between
the Board and the Treasury” (FOMC Minutes, 2/8/51, p. 70).
The Executive Committee met on Wednesday February 14. At the meet-
ing, McCabe told the Committee how political pressure had converged on the
Fedfromboththeexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofgovernment. Secretary
Snyder had announced on Saturday, February 10, that he was going into the
hospitalonSunday. (Hisdoctorhadadvisedhimtohaveacataractoperation.)
McCabe called Snyder, who urged him to do nothing for the two weeks he
expected to be in the hospital. Snyder then called Senator Maybank.
Senators Maybank (D. South Carolina), Robertson (D. Virginia), and
O’Mahoney (D. Wyoming) called McCabe (FOMC Minutes, 2/14/51, p. 79).R. L. Hetzel and R. F. Leach: New NarrativeAccount 49
All three were members of the Committee on Banking and Currency and
O’Mahoney was Chairman of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report.
O’Mahoney told McCabe that Representative Patman and Senator Capehart
(R. Indiana) wanted to hold hearings that would be critical of the Fed. May-
bank, Robertson, and O’Mahoney supported Snyder’s advice to withdraw the
FOMC’s letter to the President. McCabe told the FOMC, “It was evident
from my conversations with the Senators that they were fearful of publicity of
our letter to the President and of public hearings” (FOMC Minutes, 2/14/51,
pp. 80–81). The senators urged the Fed to do nothing while Snyder was in the
hospital (Sproul 1952, p. 522).
To emphasize his point that the Fed should not openly confront the exec-
utive branch, O’Mahoney sent McCabe a letter stating:
The Soviet dictators are convinced that the capitalistic world will wreck
itself by economic collapse arising from the inability or unwillingness
of different segments of the population to unite upon economic policy.
Inﬂation in the United States is the result of no single cause and therefore
cannot be remedied by a single cure....Itisimperative in this crisis that
there should be no conﬂict between the Federal Reserve Board and the
Treasury. (FOMC Minutes, 2/14/51, p. 83)
The banking community contributed to the Fed’s isolation by refusing to sup-
port its position. On February 2, the Board had met with the FederalAdvisory
Council, which represents the views of large banks. At that meeting, Ec-
cles accused bankers of a lack of “courage and realistic leadership” (Board
Minutes, 2/20/51, p. 389).
The Executive Committee refused to withdraw the FOMC’s letter to the
President. Furthermore, it wrote a deﬁant letter to Senator O’Mahoney. The
initialsubstantiveparagraphbeganwiththefamousquotefromJohnMaynard
Keynes: “[T]hat the best way to destroy the Capitalist System was to debauch
the currency” (FOMC Minutes, 2/14/51, p. 87). The letter expressed hope for
an agreement with the Treasury, but ended by saying that if such agreement
were not possible “[W]e will have no defensible alternative but to do what, in
our considered judgment, is for the best interests of the country, in accordance
with our statutory responsibilities” (FOMC Minutes, 2/14/51, p. 89).
TheFedthenforcedresolutionofthedispute. ItinformedtheTreasurythat
as of February 19, it “was no longer willing to maintain the existing situation
in the Government security market” (U.S. Treasury 1951, p. 266). Sproul
(1952, p. 522) recounted that the Fed informed theTreasury that “unless there
was someone at the Treasury who could work out a prompt and deﬁnitive
agreement with us...wewould have to take unilateral action.” At the time,
the Treasury faced a sizable need to refund existing debt. For the ﬁrst time,
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markets, the Treasury believed it had no choice but to end the public dispute
(U.S. Treasury 1951, p. 270).
On the morning of February 26, McCabe and Sproul attended a meeting
in the White House with the President and other government policymakers.
(Snyder remained in the hospital.) Truman read a memorandum stating that
“Changingtheinterestrateisonlyoneofseveralmethodstobeconsideredfor
curbing credit expansion.” He then asked the Fed chairman and other policy-
makers “to study ways and means to provide the necessary restraint on private
credit expansion and at the same time to make it possible to maintain stability
in the market for government securities” (FOMC Minutes, 2/26/51, p. 102).
As an alternative to a rise in interest rates, Truman asked for selective credit
controls(“directGovernmentcontrols”)tolimitcreditextension(FOMCMin-
utes, 2/26/51, p. 102). When Chairman McCabe “commented on the situation
created by the continued purchase by the System of...bonds,” Treasury Un-
der Secretary Foley countered “that the proposed action by the Federal Open
Market Committee might cause a crisis which should be avoided.” While the
meeting was underway, the White House released the contents of the Presi-
dent’s memorandum to the press.
The Treasury maintained the position that direct controls on credit were
preferabletoincreasesininterestrates(FOMCMinutes,3/1/51,p.117). How-
ever, the Treasury also believed that an end to the dispute with the Fed would
restore market conﬁdence and allow it to continue to sell bonds at 2 1/2 per-
cent (FOMC Minutes, 3/3/51, p. 153). Moreover, as became apparent later,
the Treasury still had another weapon to use.
When Snyder went into the hospital, he left negotiations with the Fed
in the hands of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, William McChesney
Martin.22 Martin notiﬁed the Fed that he desired negotiations based on the
FOMC’sFebruary7letter. HereestablishedstaffcontactbetweentheTreasury
andtheFed, whichSnyder, asLeachrecalls, hadforbiddensomeyearsearlier.
William McChesney Martin and Fed staff members Robert Rouse, Woodlief
Thomas, and especially Winﬁeld Rieﬂer, negotiated an agreement between
the Treasury and the Fed (FOMC Minutes, 2/26/51, p. 93; FOMC Minutes,
3/1/51, pp. 112–13).
As presented to the FOMC on March 1, the resulting agreement reﬂected
Rieﬂer’s original ideas. The Fed would keep the discount rate at 1 3/4 per-
cent through the end of 1951. The Treasury would remove marketable bonds
from the market by exchanging them for a nonmarketable bond yielding 2 3/4
22 Martin had exceptional qualiﬁcations. In 1938, at age 31, he became president of the
New York Stock Exchange. Newspapers called him the “boy wonder of Wall Street.” After the
Army drafted him in World War II, he helped run the Russian lend-lease program. In 1946, he
became head of the Export-Import Bank. In December 1948, Treasury Secretary Snyder, a fellow
Missourian, convinced Martin to join the Treasury. Finally, Martin’s father had been Governor of
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percent.23 To make those bonds liquid and thus more attractive to the market,
theTreasurywouldexchangethemuponrequestfora11/2percentmarketable
ﬁve-year note. During the exchange, the Fed would support the price of the
ﬁve-year notes. That support was central because the value of the nonmar-
ketable bonds depended upon the price of the ﬁve-year note. However, the





or more frank or more open discussions” (FOMC Minutes, 3/1/51, p. 118).
ThemainstickingpointfortheFOMCwaswhethertheTreasuryhadaccepted,
duringthebondexchange, alimitationbothonthedurationanddollaramount
of its intervention in support of the ﬁve-year note (FOMC Minutes, 3/1/51,
p.136). Also,theFOMCwantedtomakesurethatitscommitmenttomaintain
“orderly markets” did not imply a rate peg.
The FOMC met again on March 3, 1951. Chairman McCabe said that
Mr. Murphy, Special Counsel to the President, had inquired on behalf of
President Truman whether long-term bonds would drop below par. McCabe
had replied to Murphy that he could not say. During the meeting, Rieﬂer
received a telephone call from Martin informing him that Secretary Snyder,




The FOMC then voted to ratify the Accord and to issue the following
statement the next day: “The Treasury and the Federal Reserve System have
reached full accord with respect to debt-management and monetary policies
to be pursued in furthering their common purpose to assure the successful
ﬁnancingoftheGovernment’srequirementsand,atthesametime,tominimize
monetization of the public debt” (FOMC Minutes, 3/3/51, pp. 156, 163).
The Administration had one more hope that it would prevail.24 While in
the hospital, Snyder conveyed to Truman the message that he felt he could no
longer work with McCabe. Without a working relationship with theTreasury,
McCabe could not function as Chairman of the Board of Governors. McCabe
sentinabitterletterofresignation,butresubmittedablandversionwhenasked
to do so by the White House. McCabe, however, conditioned his resignation
on the requirement that his successor be acceptable to the Fed. On March 15,
23About $40 billion in 2 1/2 percent bonds were outstanding (U.S. Treasury, 1950 Annual
Report, Table 17).
24 Donovan (1982, p. 328) wrote, “Truman forced McCabe out as chairman of the Board of
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the President appointed William McChesney Martin to replace McCabe. The
Senate conﬁrmed Martin on March 21. McCabe left ofﬁce on March 31, and
Martin took ofﬁceApril 2.
Leach recalls that the initial reaction both among Board staff and onWall
Street to Martin’s appointment was that the Fed had won the battle but lost the
war. That is, the Fed had broken free from the Treasury, but then the Treasury
had recaptured it by installing its own man. However, as FOMC Chairman,
Martin supported Fed independence. Some years later, Martin happened to
encounter Harry Truman on a street in NewYork City. Truman stared at him,
said one word, “traitor,” and then continued.25 Leon Keyserling (1971, p. 11),
chairman of the Council of EconomicAdvisers from 1950 through 1952, said
later: “[Truman] was as strong as any President had ever been in recognizing
the evils of tight money....He sent Martin over to the Treasury to replace
McCabe. Martin promptly double-crossed him.”
InhisspeechacceptinganappointmenttotheBoardofGovernors, Martin
(1951, p. 377) said:
Unless inﬂation is controlled, it could prove to be an even more serious
threat to the vitality of our country than the more spectacular aggressions
of enemies outside our borders. I pledge myself to support all reasonable
measures to preserve the purchasing power of the dollar.
The Treasury’s offering of the new 2 3/4 percent nonmarketable notes in
exchange for the 2 1/2 percent marketable issues took place from March 26
through April 6. During this period, as provided for in the Accord, the Fed
purchased the ﬁve-year notes as needed to support their price. However, the
Fed spent the entire amount agreed to in the ﬁrst three days. “[D]ismayed
Treasury ofﬁcials asked for continued support. The request was refused, and
there was nothing more the Treasury could do about the matter” (Hyman
1976, p. 351). The Fed just said “No.” Thereafter, the Fed bought only small
amounts of the bonds to prevent “disorderly conditions in the market.” Their
price went from around 100 3/4 before the Accord to around 97 in the last
half of the year “when the bond market was on its own” (Board 1951 Annual
Report, p. 5).
Under its new leadership, the FOMC had issued its ultimate challenge to
the White House. Why did Truman ﬁnally walk away from the conﬂict? For
Truman to triumph over the Fed, he would have had to prevail in Congress;
however,hisprecariouspoliticalpositioninearlyApril1951madethatimpos-
sible. Truman’s political popularity had plummeted in part because of scan-
dal. Earlier that year, Senator Fulbright (D. Arkansas) had released a report
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accusing two directors of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), one
a politically well-connected Democrat, of favoritism (Donovan 1982, p. 333).
More important, shortly after the conclusion of theAccord, a much more
serious and long-simmering crisis boiled over: the tension between President
Truman and General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur had opposed Truman’s
policy of limited war, saying that it amounted to “surrender.” Truman had
made the decision to seek peace in Korea through its partition at the 38th
parallel rather than to engage China in a wider war, which he feared would
involve the Soviet Union and atomic weapons. On February 13, MacArthur
called Truman’s policy “unrealistic and illusory.”26
On March 24, MacArthur claimed that he could defeat China if only
Washington would stop restricting him militarily. He even offered “to confer
intheﬁeldwiththecommander-in-chiefoftheenemyforces.” Hisstatements
sabotaged secret negotiations to settle the war. Representative Joseph (Joe)
Martin (R. Mass.) advocated the use of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces in Formosa
to open a second front against China. MacArthur supported Martin in a let-
ter, which included the phrase “There is no substitute for victory” (Donovan
1982, p. 352). On April 5, Martin read MacArthur’s letter in the House of
Representatives.
On April 10, four days after the end of the bond exchange, Truman ﬁred
MacArthur. Truman biographer Robert Donovan (1982, p. 358) wrote that
Truman “knew well enough that he would awake in a political climate raised
toapitchofhatredandrecriminationsoseverethatitcouldnotfailtostainthe
remainderofhisterminofﬁce. OfallthestormshelivedthroughasPresident,
the one about to break was the worst.” To aggravate Truman’s problems,
MacArthur learned from the radio that Truman had ﬁred him. The Chicago
Tribune wrote in a front page editorial: “Truman must be impeached and
convicted....[H]eisunﬁt,morallyandmentally,forhishighofﬁce”(Donovan
1982, p. 359).
Subsequent events gave the Fed time to incubate its fragile independence.
Inﬂation abated sharply. CPI inﬂation averaged just over 3 percent from
1951Q2 through 1951Q4 and just less than 1.5 percent in 1952. Also, Dwight
D. Eisenhower, Truman’s successor and President from 1953 through 1960,
and his Treasury secretaries shared the Fed’s goal of price stability (Saulnier
1991).
3. CONCLUDING COMMENT
The March 1951 Accord marked the start of the modern Federal Reserve
System. Under Chairman Martin, the Fed’s overriding goals became price
stability and macroeconomic stability.
26 This paragraph and the next are from Donovan (1982, pp. 349–51).54 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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